The US has a long history of falsifying justification to further its warmongering international policy interests.
November, 2013
The signing of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and the formal US intervention in Vietnam in 1964 was a systemic power grab by the US in an attempt to limit the power of the Soviet Union by halting Communist expansion into the Southeastern peninsula of Asia. The US was unjustified in its attacks on the sovereign nation of North Vietnam because the US, in partnership with South Vietnam, was the aggressor, leading strategic bombing on military installations in North Vietnam1. The US military then falsified an attack on two US destroyers deployed in the Tonkin Gulf to garner the Constitutionally-necessary support of Congress to further the amount of assistance given to the South Vietnamese government1. The fact that the US used unscrupulous domestic tactics to achieve the goal of intervention in North Vietnam shows how determined the US was at stemming the Soviet projection of power and protecting its own interests.
In international politics, systemic theory classifies states as one of three powers- a polar power, a nonpolar major power, and a minor power. A polar power is the paramount state of the world and holds the majority of the world’s political pull. The vast extent of a polar state’s power allows for most of their initiatives to be successful. A major nonpolar power is a state that has a lot of power- be it through economic, military, or diplomatic power- and thus proves to be a powerful ally and a contestant for polarity, but falls short of exerting its power over the entire global political system. A minor power is a weak nation that usually must depend on other states to survive. The geopolitical system as a whole can be divided into three different systemic classifications depending on the power dynamics at the time- unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar. Unipolar systems have one polar power, bipolar systems have two polar powers, and multipolar systems have multiple polar powers.
At the end of World War II, the multipolar geopolitical system collapsed due to the strain that the war put on most former polar powers (i.e. Germany, Britain, France.) Two polar powers emerged from the war- Russia and the US. Under systemic theory, the unipolar power is the most desirable position to be in as a state, and a multipolar or bipolar system will inevitably erupt in conflict due to one polar state’s attempt to force its way into the unipolar power position, or a major nonpolar power’s bid for geopolitical polarity. Very soon after the emergence of a bipolar dominance following WWII, a conflict erupted between the polar states of the US and Russia, causing a scramble by both states to increase its geopolitical power. This power-struggle between the two polar powers is known to us as the Cold War.
Central to understanding the US intervention in Vietnam and the rapid and near unanimous approval of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution by Congress is an understanding of the policy of containment adopted by the United States after World War II. Containment sought to stem what the Western nations saw as Soviet imperialist expansionism. Following the destruction of Europe, Africa, and Eastern Asia during World War II, the United States was the most involved active belligerent that saw the least amount of damage to its territory and population. Russia used the situation in postwar Europe, as well as its territorial holdings awarded under the Potsdam Agreement, to its advantage. Historically isolated from participation in European politics, a weakened Western Europe presented the opportunity for the projection of Russian power to unprecedented breadth. In the years following the end of the Axis reign on Europe, Russia was successful in establishing satellite governments in many Eastern European countries, notably in Poland and the former Austria-Hungary empire, establishing an “iron curtain” of Communism as far west as Berlin. The Truman administration saw Communist insurrection and Soviet projection as a threat to the entire world. American voters, however, did not want to risk any conflict so soon after the end of WWII due to the high economic and personal cost of battle, and the fact that citizens of the United States did not view Stalin as a substantial threat2. Truman, however, saw the Soviet expansionism as reminiscent of Hitler’s actions before World War II, and believed that an expansion of Soviet Communism was a threat to free democracy around the world, and a threat to the delicate postwar export economy of the United States.
When British forces pulled out of Greece in 1947, Truman felt deeply compelled to intervene to limit Soviet power in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, despite popular retrenchment sentiment in the US at the time. In order to sell his Greek defense plan to Congress, Truman and his advisors expounded the “domino theory.” This theory hypothesized that if one country fell to Communism, all countries surrounding the newly formed Communist state would, in turn, fall to Communism, thus expanding and proliferating Soviet power throughout the world indefinitely. Greece, the Truman Administration argued, was paramount to containing the spread of Communism to the Middle East and Western Europe. If Greece fell to Communism, Turkey would be unsalvageable, and access to many major sea trade routes would be limited if not outright impossible2. The ideology of Communism would then be more likely to seep into US-friendly states in Western Europe and disrupt peace and economic cooperation.
To further the fight the “Red Menace” from spreading across Europe and the Middle East, the Truman administration introduced the Marshall Plan, which would loan US capital to the war-torn continent of Europe in order to fund rebuilding and defensive efforts. The ideology behind this plan dictated that Communism proliferates in conditions of unrest and poverty, and US aid would help establish order in at-risk states and friendly relations between the United States and recipient states. Like war loans in WWI, and the Cash and Carry and Lend/Lease programs of World War II, the Marshall Plan was a way for the US to increase its diplomatic presence in the world, while making millions of dollars for US-based lending firms and banks, and avoiding the unpopular option of direct military mobilization against the Russian Motherland2. The Marshall Plan was also essential in mitigating German disdain towards Western occupation, which was viewed as a key factor leading up to the rise of Nationalist Power in the late 1920s Germany and precipitated the Second World War3. Truman thought that German revolt against the Western powers could lead to the collapse of Germany into a Communist Soviet satellite, endangering the nearby nations, namely France, Britain, and Belgium. An economically successful Germany was a content Germany, and social and economic stability was the key to reintegration and the installation of a successful capitalist democratic political system. The last goal of the Marshall Plan was to provide strength to the depleted armies of Western Europe, in the contingent event of a necessity of force against Soviet aggression. If the Western European nations were highly competent in their defense capabilities, the Red Army may defer further aggression entirely to avoid substantial losses to their forces2.
Parallel to the Marshal Plan was the Truman Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine, first presented by President Truman in a speech attempting to persuade the American public and Congress to send aid to Greece, was a plan to “…support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures2.” In other words, the Truman doctrine established a moral obligation in the United States to prevent the spread of Communism in the world, be it caused by internal strife or Soviet forces. The speech was a success, and Congress eventually appropriated funds (albeit, minimal funds) to assist Greece and Turkey suppress Communist insurrections.
The People of the United States were still not quite sold on containment at the beginning of 1948. The counterinsurgency project in Greece was becoming an arduous and extended conflict, aggravating the war-weary American electorate2. In 1948, however, a Communist coup in Czechoslovakia sent a shock wave through American citizens who were still reeling from the effects of peculiarly similar events preceding World War II. As a result, the US Senate passed the Marshall Plan and diplomats from France, Britain, and the US all signed mutual defense treaties in preparation for what was viewed as a potential precursor to World War III2.
Over the next fifteen years, the United States became an increasingly prevalent intervention force on the geopolitical scene. Rising support for the Truman Doctrine of containment led to intervention in Korea in 1950 after North Korean Communists invaded South Korea. Anti-Communist sentiment in America rose to a fever pitch in the 1950s (the so-called “Red Scare,”) which fed the public’s antipathy towards Communism. Anti-communist projects such as the witch hunt led by Joe McCarthy in the 1950’s concretized the Cold War and created a perceived threat of Communist insurrection in the minds of the American public. By 1964, the domestic belief that American military clout had the obligation to prevent the spread of Communism worldwide was steadfastly entrenched. The American people saw Soviet expansionism in the form of the spread of Communism as evil as the expansionism of Germany in the late 1930’s, and were willing to go to great lengths to secure the world against the ‘Soviet scourge’4.
By the time John Kennedy took office in 1961, the situation in Vietnam was already deteriorating. The South Vietnamese forces of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and the Communist Viet Cong forces had been fighting for over two years, and the Viet Cong were pulling ahead with their prowess in stealth and politics5. The United States formally allied themselves with the South Vietnamese ARVN in 1960, and escalated the frequency and breadth of covert attacks against the North Vietnamese in 1961. This intervention program was completely unknown to the American public at the time. An American-contrived coup against South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dihn Diem sought to bring more uniformity and meticulous military planning to the Vietnamese conflict, however it merely erupted into more chaos, throwing the ARVN forces into further disarray. As the Viet Cong forces grew larger and obtained more advanced and varied weaponry, it was clear to the United States that they would lose the entire Vietnamese peninsula to Communism if they did not escalate their efforts to intervene.
From 1961-1963, it is predicted that as many as 95 CIA paratroopers were imprisoned as enemy belligerents or killed by the North Vietnamese government following several botched infiltration and sabotage missions on the northern half of the peninsula5. Because of the growing security concern in South Vietnam and the lack of success of these infiltration missions, the US Military stepped in as the defender of South Vietnam. In 1964, the military began running joint raids and bombing runs on North Vietnamese military installations with the South Vietnamese government, even though the US was militarily unprovoked by the North. This joint-offensive plan was classified in the US under the codename OPLAN 34A. OPLAN 34A was a military strategy reached between the US and South Vietnam to “make the North bleed,” while making the “hit-and-run” attacks “non-attributable to US forces5.” Despite the plan’s emphasis on cooperation, the operations were carried out almost entirely by US forces with US gear, unbeknownst to Congress and the US electorate, and communication between the South Vietnam and the US was nearly nonexistent.
The first part of OPLAN 34A involved warrantless seizure and search of civilian fishing vessels in Vietnamese waters, attributed to the attempt to dissuade and prevent infiltration of South Vietnam by Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnamese) forces, even though there was minimal, if any, evidence indicating that infiltration through fishing boats was a common tactic used by the DRV5. Part two of the OPLAN 34A involved the mobilization of secret military camps established to perform sporadic, covert attacks on DRV military targets, almost all of which were unsuccessful. In one such instance, a Navy SEAL team was dispatched to infiltrate the DRV by sea and set charges to destroy DRV junkers in DRV harbors. This operation was botched however, when nearby North Vietnamese fishermen saw the SEALs approaching and notified security forces. Three of the four men were captured and the remaining SEAL drowned trying to escape capture5. Two similar attacks on the harbor were also unsuccessful, even after an increase in training exercises.
Mid-1964 saw a myriad of similar failures and few successes. One notable successful attack on the DRV forces occurred in mid-June 1964, where US forces destroyed a DRV factory. This factory, it was discovered, was actually a civilian factory for the production of fish sauce, but the success was accounted as a “morale victory” for the US-led forces. Whilst this unsuccessful campaign was being carried out by US forces, the public back in the states was still unaware of the extent of US involvement in raids on the DRV. The public was informed that the attacks were being performed by the ARMV under, at most, consultation of US-led advisors. The reality, however, was that the majority of operations were contrived and carried out by US forces, and the operation was actually a US-run sabotage campaign with minimal support from the ARMV, rather than the portrayal received in the States as an ARMV military operation with peripheral support from the US.
On August 2nd, 1964, North Vietnam retaliated against the US for its covert operations against the DRV. North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked the destroyer the USS Maddox which was on patrol in international waters 16 miles outside of North Vietnam. It was later discovered that the order to attack the destroyer was recalled by the DRV commanders, but not until the dogfight between the two forces had nearly drawn to a close5. The Maddox intercepted and translated the North Vietnamese communications before the attack, and had already begun to take evasive maneuvers by the time the torpedo boats had appeared. In a fight already weighed in favor of the Maddox, the DRV torpedo boats were subjected to heavy fire from the torpedo-destroyer ship- the Maddox fired 283 rounds in the battle- and were forced to return to shore, their mission unaccomplished, with one boat severely damaged. During the torpedo boats’ retreat, fighter jets from the nearby aircraft carrier the Ticonderoga attacked the boats, causing even more serious damage to the damaged torpedo boat and damaging the other two unscathed boats. This led the military to conclude, incorrectly, that at least one boat was dead-in-the-water.
The Senate, informed of the attack four days later, would be informed that all three attacking boats had been sunk5. The Senate was also informed that the attack was unprovoked, and that the US had not taken part in any of the prior raids or infiltration missions on DRV in cooperation with the ARMV, a fact that we already know to be blatantly false. US Secretary of Defense McNamara also falsely informed the Senate that the Maddox did not attack until after the torpedo boats had fired a first time, and that the Maddox had been 30 miles off shore- not 15. Johnson decided not to retaliate for this instance. It is stated in his memoirs that he made this decision because he was unsure that the order was given by the DRV commanders, as suggested by the interception of the communication recalling the attack on the Maddox. This stance, however, was about to change.
The Maddox was ordered back on its patrol, this time within nine and a half miles of the mainland, a mile and a half past the border claimed by North Vietnam. This mile and a half penetration was to show the American refusal to accept the 11 mile border line. This procedure, however, provoked and antagonized the DRV, feeding the perception of the captain of the Maddox that the North Vietnamese had effectively declared war on the US and considered any US naval ship to be an enemy belligerent5.
On August 4, 1964, the Maddox, now on patrol with its sister ship the USS Turner Joy, had been cruising roughly 16 miles from the North Vietnamese shore throughout the day, and radio traffic suggested that the Maddox may be attacked, again. Both ships had been experiencing electronic difficulties- the Turner Joy with her targeting systems, and the Maddox with her radar and friend-or-foe Identifier system. The weather was poor, and both ships were blacked-out after nightfall. There was no natural light from the moon or stars, so visibility was nonexistent. Bad weather is often known to interfere with sonar systems, and August 4th was an especially difficult night for a radar operator in the Tonkin Gulf. A number of factors could have caused false sonar blips including squalls, waves, marine life, storm clouds, and even the sound created by the ships as they turned. As night fell, the sonar crew on the Maddox detected blips on its radar, seemingly right in the course of the previous night’s route. The blips were determined to be naval ships because of their speed and positioning. The Maddox was put on general quarters in preparation for an attack on the ship.
At 9PM, the Maddox radarman reported the blip nearest to the ship had fired torpedoes and turned away1. Both the Maddox and the Turner Joy immediately began evasive measures, swerving again and again from perceived torpedo attacks. Over the course of the night, 22 total torpedoes were reported to have been fired (the boats used by the DRV had a maximum capacity of two torpedoes each.) The Turner Joy began firing at every radar blip on their horizon, while the Maddox used star shells to unsuccessfully attempt to illuminate bogeys in the water. Eight minutes after the radar sighting, air units from a nearby aircraft carrier arrived, firing at areas marked by star shells. These air units continued to fire until running out of fuel and returning to dock. The ships continued to operate in general quarters and in an evasive course. Around midnight, the main gun man on the Maddox reported a blip 1500 yards away from the ship. He asked for permission to fire, but before he did, demanded that the Turner Joy turn on her bridge lights to ensure that the Maddox was not aiming at her sister ship. The Turner Joy obliged, and the Maddox’s gunman realized he was staring down the barrel of a 5-inch ship cannon pointed directly at the Turner Joy.
At the end of the night, no evidence remained that any conflict had actually occurred. Neither ship had incurred any damage, and no enemy ships, operational or dead-in-the-water were ever spotted.
The August 4th “attack,” however, was not the unprovoked act of aggression that the US military presented it to be. The night before, on August 3-4, US forces carried out a OPLAN 34A raid on the coast of North Vietnam, destroying a radar station and a naval defensive stronghold at the mouth of the Ron River. These installations were attacked with guns similar to those present on the Maddox and Turner Joy, leading the DRV to accuse the Maddox and Turner Joy of carrying out the raids5. This suspicion was furthered by the proximity of the Turner Joy on the morning of August 4th, however this was a result of a failure to communicate to the captain of the destroyer to pilot his ship northwards (the captain of the Turner Joy, Herrick, was not informed of any of the OPLAN 34A raids occurring in the vicinity of his ship.) Furthermore, the OPLAN 34A forces had planned another raid on the night of August 4th, prompting the suspicious DRV to enact defensive measures. These defensive measures taken on mainland North Vietnam against a US-led coastal raid are more than likely the cause of the perception of an attack on the Maddox on the night of 4th. The DRV’s actions also led the August 4th raiding party to cancel the attack and retreat to South Vietnamese bases.
Why would the US military deliberately mislead Congress and, in turn, the public, to backing a war in reality provoked entirely by US forces and precipitated by a nonexistent naval attack? The National Security Council and Joint Chiefs of Staff had been considering measures to force a DRV attack on US forces for some months before the August 4th incident5. A report from September 1964 included a suggestion that the US should take actions “that would be likely to provoke a military DRV response…and provide good grounds for us to escalate if we wished5.” The top leaders of United States had just that wish.
The Johnson administration, as the Kennedy administration, knew the dangers of a communist Vietnam. Vietnam was the portal to the Southeastern Asian peninsula. It neighbored a Communist China to the east, and was not far removed from the Soviet Union and her communist satellite chain. If South Vietnam were to fall to North Vietnamese Communist forces, the US interests in Southeast Asia would be at risk, and Soviet projection of power was sure to increase. The Vietnam conflict inextricably ties back into the Cold War and the US’s systemic bipolar struggle with Soviet Russia. The Johnson administration, however, was more willing to pressure the DRV into war than was the Kennedy administration, evidenced by the escalation of OPLAN 34A and related military operations following the assassination of Kennedy in November of 1963.
The assassination of Kennedy itself is directly related to the Vietnam war, although time and relevance constrains us from examining the effects of the regime change on the Vietnam War. If the US could further stem Communist expansion, the power of the Soviet Union would be diminished, allowing for the US conception of a post-WWII world to flourish. For the leaders of the US, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was the very means of facilitating that conception.
Benjamin A. Craighton
- 1 Goulden, Joseph C. Truth is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin Affair: Illusion and Reality. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969. Print.
- 2 Ambrose, Stephen E., and Douglas Brinkley. “The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.” Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938. 8th rev. ed. New York: Penguin Books, 1997. Print.
- 3 Keylor, William R.. “The Western World in The Twenties: The Illusions Dispelled.” The Twentieth-Century World and Beyond : An International History since 1900. 5th ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. 169-192. Print.
- 4 Wall, Wendy. “Anti-Communism in the 1950s.” The Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History. Web. 13 Dec. 2013. http://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/fifties/essays/anti-communism-1950s
- 5 Moïse, Edwin E. Tonkin Gulf and the escalation of the Vietnam War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996. Print.
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